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Folk wisdom has it that some people see their glass as being 
half full while for others it is half empty. In fact, it is true that 
people vary in how they interpret ambiguous events and the 
extent to which they attend to negative or positive informa-
tion. We also know that these tendencies are associated with 
susceptibility to emotional distress, such that those who are 
prone to anxiety or depression are more likely than others to 
interpret ambiguity in a negative way, attend more to emotion-
ally negative cues, and selectively recall negative information 
(Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Like people, animals also vary 
in their responses to ambiguous events and, concordantly, in 
their degree of emotional distress. In one study, dogs assessed 
as being high or low in separation anxiety were trained to 
expect to find food in a bowl placed in one location but not 
when it was in another location. When the bowl was put in a 
position intermediate between these two locations, dogs higher 
in anxiety were less likely than others to investigate it, appar-
ently assuming that it would be empty (Mendl et al., 2010; for 
related findings with rats, see Harding, Paul, & Mendl, 2004). 
Such results illustrate basic connections between emotion and 
the way in which affectively relevant events are attended, 
interpreted, and remembered, but until recently, the causal 
nature of those connections has remained unclear.
This article briefly reviews experiments in the new tradition 
of cognitive bias modification (CBM). This term (CBM) refers 
to procedures designed to change particular styles of cognitive 
processing that are thought to contribute to undesirable emo-
tional reactions or disorders, using systematic practice in an 
alternative processing style (Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009). 
CBM experiments have demonstrated that cognitive biases can 
indeed be modified and that the induced changes influence sub-
sequent emotional reactivity. The approach is not especially 
novel; it simply involves applying basic principles of experi-
mentation to discover the nature of the connections between 
cognitive and affective tendencies: A variable believed to affect 
the putative causal process is manipulated, and the effect on 
an outcome measure is observed. There is a long tradition in 
cognitive research of varying affective states—by way of a 
musical manipulation, for example—to determine whether 
mood influences some measure of subsequent cognition. In 
contrast, CBM reverses the direction of cause under investiga-
tion to determine whether changes in cognition affect emotional 
characteristics. The methods we describe are thus quite general 
in their derivation and applicability and can be used to investi-
gate a wide range of specific questions. Because they are so 
general, our main purpose is to discuss similarities between 
CBM paradigms and older, more traditional paradigms used in 
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research on learning and memory, such as counterconditioning 
and transfer-appropriate processing. We also discuss CBM in 
relation to research on mood-congruent cognition and appraisal 
theories of emotion. Through such comparisons we hope to 
emphasize the fundamental principles at work in CBM and to 
suggest directions for future work. But first things first: We 
begin by briefly describing the nature of the cognitive biases 
that have been linked to anxious and depressed states and then 
turn to the methods that have been developed to modify such 
biases as well as to the effects of those modifications on emo-
tional reactivity.
Cognitive Biases in Emotional States
Attentional bias
Attention to affective information has commonly been 
assessed by using designs in which the presence of task-irrele-
vant but affectively meaningful words or pictures can influ-
ence the latency of responses to an intended target. In the 
emotional Stroop task, for example, naming the color in which 
words are written tends to be slower when the content of such 
words is emotionally negative or matches the current concerns 
of the participant (reviewed by Williams, Mathews, & 
MacLeod, 1996). More definitive evidence of attentional 
biases has emerged for search tasks in which participants 
respond to simple targets (e.g., arrows or letters) that appear in 
the prior location of either an emotional or neutral cue (e.g., 
words such as disease versus cabinet) by pressing a key as 
quickly as they can. When both emotionally negative and neu-
tral cues are presented simultaneously and replaced a few hun-
dred milliseconds later by a single target in one of the cued 
locations, anxious individuals are typically faster to respond to 
targets appearing in locations just vacated by threatening 
rather than neutral cues, whereas nonanxious control partici-
pants show the reverse pattern (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 
1986; meta-analysis by Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Baker-
mans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007). These results 
have been interpreted as indicating either greater engagement 
of attention in the vicinity of threat cues by anxious partici-
pants, slower disengagement from threat cues, or both. When 
a single threat cue is presented in one of two possible loca-
tions, anxious individuals are particularly slow to detect tar-
gets appearing in the other location, suggesting that they have 
special difficulty in disengaging their attention from threat 
(Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Yiend & Mathews, 
2001). However, studies using endogenous cueing (e.g., neu-
tral or fearful faces with gaze directed to left or right locations) 
suggest that anxious individuals are both more likely to direct 
their attention to locations of potential threat—such as toward 
the direction of fearful gaze—and slower to disengage from 
such locations (Fox, Mathews, Calder, & Yiend, 2007; 
Mathews, Fox, Yiend, & Calder, 2003). This conclusion is 
consistent with clinical observations that people with specific 
fears orient their gaze toward the possible locations of the 
object of their fear, as when a person fearful of spiders con-
stantly looks for any sign of spiders in likely hiding places so 
as to be able to escape if necessary (Rinck, Kwakkenbos, 
Dotsch, Wigboldus, & Becker, 2010).
Depressed individuals also show similar attentional biases, 
although these biases seem to operate over a somewhat slower 
time scale and (unsurprisingly) are directed at stimuli more 
related to depression than fear (e.g., sad faces; Hankin, Gibb, 
Abela, & Flory, 2010; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; but see 
Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000). In contrast, nondepressed 
individuals are more likely to attend to positive stimuli. Over-
all, emotional stimuli tend to capture attention more than do 
neutral ones, but whereas this tendency in healthy individuals 
applies as much (and sometimes more) to positive as to nega-
tive cues, in those prone to anxiety or depression, attention is 
more likely to be captured by negative cues, particularly when 
such cues are related to individual emotional concerns.
Interpretation bias
Relative to nonanxious control groups, anxious individuals are 
more likely to remember and report ambiguous events in terms 
of their more threatening meanings. In one early study (Eysenck, 
Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991), participants listened 
to recorded sentences, some of which were ambiguous and 
could be interpreted in either a threatening or benign manner 
(e.g., the doctor measured little Emma’s growth). Subsequently, 
they were asked to decide the extent to which related sentences 
had the same meaning as the original sentences (e.g., the doctor 
examined little Emma’s tumor versus the doctor charted little 
Emma’s height). The key finding was that nonanxious controls 
were more likely to endorse nonthreatening interpretations, 
whereas currently anxious individuals were equally likely to 
endorse threatening and nonthreatening interpretations. Similar 
results have emerged from subsequent research. For example, 
socially anxious and nonanxious participants read descriptions 
of job interviews and at ambiguous points in the text (when the 
outcome still remained unclear) were required to make speeded 
lexical decisions about words related to possible inferences con-
cerning negative or positive outcomes. Nonanxious individuals 
were consistently faster to endorse words related to positive 
inferences, whereas socially anxious individuals were equally 
fast to endorse words matching positive and negative inferences 
(Hirsch & Mathews, 2000; see also Calvo, Eysenck, & Castillo, 
1997; MacLeod & Cohen, 1993; Richards & French, 1992). 
The critical finding in each of these experiments was an interac-
tion revealing interpretation differences between anxious and 
nonanxious groups, not an outcome indicating that one or the 
other group was biased in the sense of departing from objective 
outcome probabilities (that remain unknown). It is clear, how-
ever, that higher anxiety levels are associated with a relatively 
greater tendency to perceive the more threatening meaning of 
emotional ambiguity.
There is also evidence (albeit somewhat less consistent) 
that depression is associated with negative interpretations of 
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emotional ambiguity. Depression-related differences were not 
obtained in an experiment that measured the time to name tar-
get words matching negative or benign inferences (Lawson & 
MacLeod, 1999; also see Bisson & Sears, 2007). However, 
clear differences did emerge in an experiment using startle 
modulation to measure the resolution of ambiguity (Lawson, 
MacLeod, & Hammond, 2002). Another effort (Mogg, Brad-
bury, & Bradley, 2006) failed to find depression-related differ-
ences in reading latencies but found such differences in a 
spelling task involving the interpretation of spoken homo-
phones (e.g., wore/war). Taken together, these results support 
the contention of Lawson and MacLeod that depression-
related differences in interpretation biases may be obscured in 
reaction time tasks (due to general slowing in depression) but 
emerge when interpretation is assessed in other ways.
Memory bias
Evidence of negative memory bias in depression has been well 
established for many years (for reviews, see Mathews & 
MacLeod, 2005; Matt, Vazquez, & Campbell, 1992). Whereas 
nondepressed individuals are more likely to remember positive 
self-descriptive words and happy faces, those prone to depres-
sion are relatively more likely to remember negative self-
descriptive words and sad faces. Moreover, recent experiments 
provide evidence that attentional and interpretative biases in 
depression influence the nature of what is remembered (Hertel 
& El-Messidi, 2006; Koster, de Raedt, Leyman, & de Lissnyder, 
2010; Wells, Beevers, Robison, & Ellis, 2010).
Evidence for anxiety-related biases on memory tests is 
more mixed, due to some failures to find anxiety-related dif-
ferences in the recall of threatening versus neutral words (see 
reviews by MacLeod & Mathews, 2004; Mitte, 2008). The 
failures have been attributed to ceiling effects (e.g., when 
words are encoded in relation to the self; Russo et al., 2006) 
and to the possibility that anxious individuals avoid threaten-
ing ideas as a means of emotion regulation (MacLeod & 
Mathews, 2004). However, as is the case with depression, evi-
dence for memory biases in anxiety is found when other cog-
nitive characteristics of anxiety are taken into account (such as 
imagery-based distortions in the recall of social scenarios; 
Hertel, Brozovich, Joormann, & Gotlib, 2008; see Hirsch, 
Clark, & Mathews, 2006). Anxiety-related memory biases 
also seem to depend on whether procedures allow for idiosyn-
cratic elaborations. For example, selective recall tends to 
emerge in experiments in which superficial encoding tasks 
permit but do not require personally relevant elaboration 
(MacLeod & Mathews, 2004).
In summary
Compared with the benign or positive processing style that 
characterizes healthy people, those prone to anxiety and 
depression are more likely to attend to negative or threatening 
cues, resolve ambiguity in negative ways, and selectively 
remember negative events. The critical issues addressed in the 
work discussed next are whether these cognitive biases can be 
established experimentally and thereby incur emotional con-
sequences. A fundamental assumption underlying cognitive 
therapy for emotional disorders and cognitive appraisal theo-
ries of emotion is that cognitive characteristics play a part in 
creating emotional resilience or emotional vulnerability. CBM 
procedures test this assumption.
Modifying Cognitive Biases
Good experimental control of a phenomenon is achieved if the 
phenomenon can be simulated and then eliminated. This old 
saw from the tradition of experimental psychology is made 
more meaningful by the clinical goal of eliminating biases that 
characterize emotional distress and disorders. Experiments in 
the tradition of CBM started by simulating cognitive biases 
and, in some domains of bias research, continued to the goal of 
elimination. Unless otherwise specified, the experiments 
described in the following sections were conducted with non-
clinical volunteers; only when participants were selected for 
special characteristics such as emotional vulnerability or clini-
cal condition do we specify the basis for inclusion.
Attention training
In training experiments, tasks originally developed to measure 
attention to emotional information are modified in a way 
designed to promote either attention toward threatening cues 
(such as words or pictures) or disengagement of attention from 
them. In the method first described by MacLeod, Rutherford, 
Campbell, Ebsworth, and Holker (2002), participants are 
instructed to respond as fast as possible to a neutral target 
(such as a dot), which is preceded by the display of two words, 
one threatening and one benign, for 500 ms on either side of 
fixation. In one group (attend threat), targets nearly always 
follow in the location of the threat words, while in the other 
(avoid threat), targets follow in the alternative location. Thus, 
in the former group, performance is facilitated by attention to 
the location of threat cues, whereas performance in the latter 
group is aided by not attending threat cues. Noncontingent 
probe trials show that attention is indeed deployed as intended, 
with faster latencies when the target follows in the expected 
location. However, the critical finding concerns differential 
emotional responses to a posttraining task involving insoluble 
problems. The attend-threat group reported more distress than 
did those trained to avoid threat. In later studies, several ses-
sions of similar training to attend to benign cues were found to 
reduce reported emotional reactions to a real-life event (mov-
ing to another country; See, MacLeod & Bridle, 2009).
In another type of attention task, participants are required to 
find a target picture in an array of distractors (e.g., a happy face 
among neutral faces); results have indicated that angry faces can 
be detected more rapidly than other expressions, especially by 
socially anxious individuals (Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, & Amir, 
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1999; cf. Fox et al., 2000). Dandeneau, Baldwin, Baccus, Sakel-
laropoulo, and Pruessner (2007) developed this method into a 
training task by having participants search for one smiling face 
in a matrix of 16 faces, with the other 15 having rejecting (nega-
tive) expressions. In contrast to a control condition in which 
participants searched for flowers, repeated sessions of training 
not only reduced rated work stress in telemarketers but also led 
to lower cortisol levels, an index of emotional distress.
Attention training has also been shown to have beneficial 
effects for participants suffering from clinical anxiety states, 
such as Generalized Anxiety Disorder and social phobia (for a 
meta-analysis, see Hakamata et al., 2010). Practice in respond-
ing to targets in the location of words with benign meanings or 
smiling faces, rather than threatening words or faces, resulted 
in greater reductions of clinical anxiety than did a control pro-
cedure in which targets were presented equally often in either 
location (Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009; Amir, Beard, 
Taylor, et al., 2009; Schmidt, Richey, Buckner, & Timpano, 
2009). The finding that most participants in both conditions 
believed that they had been allocated to a control group, 
despite substantial improvements in the active condition, 
potentially argues against accounts based on experimental 
demand (Amir, Beard, Taylor, et al., 2009), although it is pos-
sible that participants were aware of the training contingencies 
while nevertheless believing that benign training serves as a 
control for something more emotional. More impressive is the 
evidence from formal mediation analysis that changes in atten-
tion to threat following training mediate the reduction of anxi-
ety in response to stress (e.g., Amir, Weber, Beard, Bomyea, & 
Taylor, 2008; See et al., 2009).
In summary, repeated practice in avoiding attention to neg-
ative cues—such as threatening words or disapproving faces—
can reduce subsequent emotional reactions to potentially 
stressful events, even in highly anxious individuals. The same 
is true of practice in interpreting ambiguous events in a rela-
tively benign manner.
Interpretation training
As with attention, interpretational style can be modified using 
variations of tasks originally developed to assess biases in the 
interpretation of emotionally ambiguous events. In one such 
modification (of the method used by Eysenck et al., 1991), 
participants are required to read and imagine ambiguous event 
descriptions resolved only by the final word, presented as a 
to-be-completed fragment (i.e., a word with letters missing). 
For example:
You have decided to go caving even though you feel 
nervous about being in an enclosed space. You get to the 
caves before anyone else arrives. Going deep inside the 
cave you realize you have completely lost your . . .
This description is followed by the to-be-completed frag-
ment w_y (way, a negative outcome) or f_ar (fear, a positive 
outcome). Participants allocated to practice with either consis-
tently negative or consistently positive resolutions have been 
subsequently tested with new event descriptions that remain 
ambiguous, and their interpretations assessed by the extent to 
which the participants later endorsed either negative or posi-
tive statements as having the same meaning as the original 
descriptions. Compared with the positive group, participants 
allocated to practicing negative resolutions reported feeling 
more anxious and made more negative interpretations of the 
novel test descriptions (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). Sub-
sequent experiments showed that effects of training on inter-
pretations persisted until the next day and influenced emotional 
reactions to viewing videos of real-life accidents. Negatively 
trained groups reported greater increases in distress than did 
those who had practiced positive resolutions (Mackintosh, 
Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway, & Cook, 2006). More recent 
experiments using similar methods have produced similar out-
comes (e.g., Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2010).
In an alternative method (used originally by Grey & 
Mathews, 2000), single ambiguous words (homographs) are 
followed by to-be-completed word fragments corresponding 
to associates of the homographs’ threatening or benign mean-
ings (e.g., sink followed by dro_n or wa_h). Evidence for the 
modification of interpretation bias comes from two additional 
studies using this method (Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend, & Mack-
intosh, 2010a; Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, & Rutherford, 
2006). Responses to new test items matching the practiced 
affective valence were faster than were responses to test items 
matching the nontrained valence. Furthermore, viewing a sub-
sequent video of accidents elicited more negative emotion in 
those who had previously practiced accessing negative rather 
than benign meanings.
As with attention, modifying interpretative style has been 
shown to produce beneficial changes even in emotionally vul-
nerable groups. In participants complaining of excessive 
worry, a single session of practice in selecting the benign 
meaning of emotionally ambiguous words and descriptions 
reduced later negative thought intrusions, in contrast to control 
participants who accessed benign and threatening meanings 
equally often (Hirsch, Hayes, & Mathews, 2009). This reduc-
tion in worry was accompanied by simultaneous improve-
ments on a working memory task, suggesting that changes 
depended not on increased effort but on increased cognitive 
control achieved by the reduction of worrying. In a related 
clinical study, similar training reduced worry in patients suf-
fering from Generalized Anxiety Disorder (Hayes, Hirsch, 
Krebs, & Mathews, 2010).
Similar beneficial effects of interpretation training have 
reduced elevated social anxiety (Beard & Amir, 2008). Partici-
pants saw either positive or negative words (such as funny or 
embarrassing) followed by an ambiguous sentence (people 
laugh at something you said) and were required to decide 
whether the word and sentence were related. A positive trained 
group was always given “correct” feedback when they 
endorsed a positive word and “incorrect” feedback when they 
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endorsed a negative word, whereas a control group was given 
noncontingent feedback. Eight sessions of positive training 
led to greater decreases on a questionnaire assessing social 
anxiety than in the control group. Moreover, reductions in 
social anxiety were partially mediated by the extent to which 
endorsement of positive word–sentence pairs had increased on 
a separate, noncontingent test of interpretation bias.
Adapted versions of interpretation training have also been 
found to ameliorate or prevent depressed mood. In one ver-
sion, participants were trained to make positive interpretations 
with or without self-imagery, and only the imagery-based 
training was effective in protecting against negative mood 
(Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009; see also Blackwell & Holmes, 
2010). Another adaptation of CBM has been based on previ-
ous research showing that rumination (prolonged abstract 
thinking about the reasons for one’s problems) serves to pro-
long depression; compared with a more abstract, ruminative 
condition, a new concrete and experiential training condition 
effectively reduced depressed mood (Watkins, Baeyens, & 
Read, 2009). In summary, as with attention, practice in inter-
preting emotional ambiguity in a more positive (or negative) 
manner influences how novel ambiguous exemplars are inter-
preted and can also reduce (or increase) negative emotional 
states or the distress caused by stressful events.
Procedures for changing memory
Cognitive biases revealed on memory tests logically can be 
produced by biases operating while initially encountering or 
interpreting the event to be remembered later or by biases 
operating at the time that memory is tested. Experiments per-
formed to simulate memory biases therefore might involve 
practice in performing procedures in which the bias is manipu-
lated in any of those ways. Compared with other types of 
CBM, however, only a few experiments have been performed 
to establish biased memories, and these experiments mainly 
have modified interpretation biases in ways that produce dis-
torted memories.
One experiment trained interpretation biases with the pro-
cedures established by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) and 
found that recall of new ambiguous scenarios presented after 
training contained distortions that reflected the type of inter-
pretations practiced during training (Tran, Hertel, & Joor-
mann, 2011). In other words, ambiguous statements were 
remembered as having been nonambiguous in ways congruent 
with training. A similar experiment simulated situations in 
which interpretation biases are acquired following the events 
to be recalled; recall of initial interpretations of the ambiguous 
scenarios was distorted in line with the training condition 
experienced subsequently (Salemink, Hertel, & Mackintosh, 
2010). This outcome suggests that memory for one’s own 
thoughts can be affected by a bias acquired at a later point.
Two additional experiments used the interpretation-training 
paradigm combined with a test procedure designed to dissoci-
ate controlled and automatic influences on the memory test 
(Hertel, Vasquez, Benbow, & Hughes, in press; see Jacoby, 
1991). These experiments presented a few “critical” scenar-
ios—some resolved negatively and some positively—at the 
end of a traditional training phase and followed them with a 
test that produced estimates of controlled recollection of those 
critical scenarios. The results revealed that experience with 
benign training scenarios proactively interfered with the recol-
lection of the negative resolutions. This outcome, found 
with both low and high trait-anxious students, implies that 
benign interpretation training might be used as a cognitive 
vaccine against later negative memory biases (see Holmes 
et al., 2009).
Another means of modifying memory is to reduce the prob-
ability of recalling certain kinds of experiences. The tendency 
to remember and ruminate about negative experiences is worth 
eliminating, because rumination exacerbates depressive states 
(see Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). In a 
recent experiment designed to promote forgetting on a later 
test, individuals with major depressive disorder and controls 
were trained to suppress negative associates to repeatedly 
encountered benign cues (Joormann, Hertel, LeMoult, & Got-
lib, 2009). Depressed participants achieved such forgetting but 
only when thought substitutes had been used to aid suppres-
sion practice (unlike controls who could forget without these 
aids). This outcome and the previously cited evidence of dis-
torted memory for initial interpretations (Salemink, Hertel, & 
Mackintosh, 2010) exemplify retroactive effects of practice 
that modify memory for earlier events. Modifications can 
therefore influence measures of memory by affecting retrieval 
processes, not merely initial interpretations.
These five experiments on modifying memory failed to 
find (or did not assess) evidence of any emotional conse-
quences. However, another study did find that instructions for 
intentional suppression practice protected against adverse 
emotional reactions to a subsequent stressful task, compared 
with a condition in which forgetting was achieved more pas-
sively (LeMoult, Hertel, & Joormann, 2010). More generally, 
the modification of memory bias might be expected to have 
emotional consequences, because previous experiments have 
shown that instructions to recall positive autobiographical 
memories can produce changes in mood states (e.g., Joormann 
& Siemer, 2004). On the other hand, deliberate reflection on 
the past is a state of mind that differs from the well-practiced, 
fluent interpretation of ongoing events that characterizes CBM 
and is potentially important in producing transfer to emotional 
reactions during ensuing stress tasks. Perhaps other methods 
of assessment will better reflect changes in emotion as a con-
sequence of changes in memory.
Whether they are fueled by the pursuit of emotional conse-
quences of memory modification or by other issues, experi-
ments on the modification of memory are ripe for the making. 
Such experiments can be designed either to alter the contents of 
memory, to impair memory for the undesirable thought or event, 
or to improve memory for the desirable thought or event. In the 
latter regard, efforts to train attention and concentration (e.g., 
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MacLean et al., 2010) should also benefit subsequent remem-
bering of emotionally benign events.
In summary
As with modification of attention to threat, practice in the pos-
itive resolution of ambiguity can transfer to new ambiguous 
situations and lead to subsequent changes in affective reactiv-
ity to potentially emotional novel events. Similarly, biases 
induced in interpretation can transfer to tests of memory for 
the initial ambiguous events and their corresponding interpre-
tations. The evidence discussed so far strongly suggests that 
cognitive biases are malleable and that modifying them can 
have consequences for memory and emotional vulnerability.
These conclusions appear to apply across a wide range of 
conditions and age groups, from the use of interpretation train-
ing to reduce social anxiety in children as young as 10 to 11 
(Vassilopoulos, Banerjee, & Prantzalou, 2009) to the induc-
tion of decreased attention to negative pictures in 60- to 
90-year-old adults (Isaacowitz & Choi, 2011). Similarly, the 
methods have become increasingly varied as they have been 
applied to different disorders. In one recent application, alco-
holic patients were retrained to make avoidant movements to 
alcohol-related pictures (Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker, & Lin-
denmeyer, 2011). Until we learn otherwise, we assume that the 
same fundamental principles are likely to apply across a wide 
range of specific applications.
Basic Mechanisms Underlying CBM
Unsurprisingly, the modification of cognitive biases relies on 
tried and true principles of experimental psychology. Always 
wary of reinventions, we now call attention to major corre-
spondences between CBM paradigms and older functional 
paradigms used in research on learning and memory. An 
advantage in noticing these similarities, beyond parsimony, is 
that connections to prior research encourage us to reconsider 
findings from those domains as grist for investigations of 
biases and their elimination.
Transfer-appropriate processing
CBM procedures are most certainly related to older experi-
ments on transfer of learning, popular in the mid-twentieth 
century (see Ellis, 1965), as well as more current approaches 
to transfer in concept learning and problem solving (e.g., 
Nokes, 2009). Researchers such as Ellis wrote about near and 
far transfer to represent the degree of overlap between training 
and transfer tasks. Although the dimension of near to far trans-
fer should be viewed as a continuum, most CBM experiments 
are near-transfer experiments because, as illustrated in Figure 
1, the situations presented and procedures invoked during 
training are similar to those in the transfer phase. Some stress-
ful transfer tasks (e.g., emotional response to viewing a video 
of dangerous accidents; Wilson et al., 2006) can be thought of 
as far-transfer tasks; the same cognitive procedures are 
assumed to be involved but the contexts differ substantially 
from those presented during training.
Near-transfer tasks in CBM have been used to explore the 
extent to which training in one type of attention or interpreta-
tion task generalizes to other tasks with similar processing 
requirements. Practice in the interpretation of homographs by 
completing word fragments thus generalizes to lexical deci-
sion speed in judging associates of ambiguous primes (Grey & 
Mathews, 2000; Hoppitt et al., 2010a; Wilson et al., 2006); 
practice in judging semantic similarity between such primes 
and related (benign or negative) words generalizes somewhat 
farther to the content of mental images cued by novel homo-
graphs (Hertel, Mathews, Peterson, & Kintner, 2003). Simi-
larly, training via searching for a smiling face in a matrix of 
negative expressions reduces interference from rejection-
related words in a modified Stroop task (Dandeneau & Bald-
win, 2004). Near-transfer effects can sometimes fail, however, 
when the type of response required or the content domain dif-
fers across training and test (Salemink, van den Hout, et al., 
2010; Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007). Far-transfer 
effects occur in the critical experiments used to establish 
causal links between cognitive processing bias and emotional 
reactivity. In these experiments, training selective attention or 
interpretation using simple word stimuli can influence later 
emotional reaction to apparently very different experiences, 
such as failing to solve difficult anagrams or viewing accident 
videos (Mackintosh et al., 2006; MacLeod et al., 2002; Wilson 
et al., 2006).
In the field of memory research, the concept of transfer has 
proved to be useful across the decades and into this century, 
mainly as a theoretical framework called transfer-appropriate 
processing (TAP; Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977). The 
initial experiments in the TAP framework revealed that perfor-
mance on memory tests was facilitated when the cognitive 
procedures invoked on the test replicated those at work during 
initial encounters—for example, when conceptual cues for 
recall, not perceptual cues, followed an initial semantic elabo-
ration task.
TAP experiments have been performed in a variety of con-
texts for learning and testing. One of the more applicable 
examples is found in a series of experiments on spontaneous 
transfer in problem solving (Needham & Begg, 1991). At the 
time of this work, few examples could be found of uninstructed 
transfer of solutions to logic-based word problems. The train-
ing problems were typically taught as examples to be studied 
and learned, whereas the transfer phase consisted of new prob-
lems to be solved. Good levels of transfer of solution methods 
to new problems was obtained when participants were told 
before the presentation of target problems to think back to 
analogous prior problems but not when the analogies were left 
implicit. This was a distressing state of affairs for applications 
to education, and we note that a parallel exists in therapeutic 
contexts. Just as the teacher is not present in later classes to 
remind the student of analogies learned in her class, the 
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clinician is not present during real-world “tests” to remind the 
client to think back to their sessions. By applying the TAP 
framework, however, Needham and Begg invented the proper 
training analog whereby participants were instructed not to 
learn the training problems but instead to solve them; under 
those conditions, spontaneous transfer to solving new prob-
lems was obtained. Conversely, studying the training prob-
lems with the goal of remembering them transferred well to 
target solutions when participants were actually instructed to 
remember specific training problems at the time of the test.
Interpretation training sessions in CBM experiments also 
establish the conditions for spontaneous transfer. Far-transfer 
effects following interpretation training depend on the active 
selection of emotional meanings during training rather than 
simple exposure to them. For example, emotional reactivity 
differences have been observed after training in which partici-
pants resolved emotional meanings of ambiguous words or 
texts for themselves but not when they read already disam-
biguated versions (Hoppitt et al. 2010a; Hoppitt, Mathews, 
Yiend, & Mackintosh, 2010b). Even larger effects would be 
expected if CBM participants were gradually encouraged to 
resolve training scenarios in the absence of fragments. More 
generally, transfer in CBM experiments seems to be successful 
to the extent that the training and transfer “problems” invoke 
the same cognitive procedures. Successful transfer to later 
emotional tasks thus depends on practice in actively selecting 
emotional meanings during training because elicitation of 
affect at test depends on similar active involvement. Neverthe-
less, even when this condition is met, far transfer to emotional 
challenges is not always obtained (e.g., Salemink et al., 2007; 
Teachman & Addison, 2008). A major goal for CBM research-
ers is to find ways to establish robust far-transfer effects in 
order to sidestep the need for individualized training in stress-
ful situations.
Attention Training Near Transfer Far Transfer (Challenge)
Latency to Find A Smiling Face
Among Rejecting Faces.
Latency to Identify Target
Replacing Either a Negative or
Positive Face.
Rated Emotion Follows Attempt
to Solve Anagrams While
Viewing Disapproving Face.
Interpretation Training Near Transfer Far Transfer (Stress)
Latency to Complete Fragment
Related to the Threatening or
Benign Meaning of the Just-
Presented Homograph.
Latency to Choose the More
Related of two Words
Following a Homograph on the
Previous Screen.
Rated Mood Before and After a
Video of a Series of Actual
Accidents.
Growth
T-mor
Stalk
Plant Paint
Frmityscl?
Jurtonbsn?
Murdsati?
Fig. 1. Examples of phases from an attention-training paradigm (Dandeneau & Baldwin, 2009) and an interpretation-
training paradigm (Wilson et al., 2006). Training phases typically consist of 80–100 trials. The dependent measures are listed 
in the table, and examples of computer displays are shown below each.
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Desirable difficulties
Another goal is to use modification procedures that last. One 
sure way to promote better memory on delayed tests is to dis-
tribute practice across sessions instead of massing the same 
amount of practice into one session (see Cepeda, Pashler, Vul, 
Wixted, & Rohrer, 2006). In a transfer-appropriate fashion, hav-
ing something come to mind after a period of not thinking about 
it facilitates the same retrieval process on subsequent attempts. 
In this regard, a few CBM experiments have taken advantage of 
the benefits of distributed practice when using multiple training 
sessions with clinical groups (e.g., Amir et al., 2009).
Distributed practice is one of several operations referred to 
as a desirable difficulty by researchers who attempt to apply 
memory principles in educational settings (Bjork, 1994). Stu-
dents and instructors alike tend to prefer “easy” instructional 
techniques that lead to rapid changes in performance (e.g., 
Kornell & Bjork, 2008); the benefits of practice are quickly 
observed, and students believe they learn better. Such prefer-
ences are probably also held by some therapists and their cli-
ents, indeed by the culture at large. Media emphasize ways of 
making learning easy and fun. Unfortunately, students often 
forget what they have learned in college classes once the test 
has been taken, and anxious or depressed individuals easily 
revert to well-practiced biases outside the therapeutic context. 
Therefore, the search for desirable difficulties in CBM research 
is worthwhile.
In addition to distributed practice, other desirable difficul-
ties identified by applied memory research include the initial 
generation of the information to be remembered, in compari-
son to merely reading it (Bjork, 1994). As we have discussed 
previously, this procedure likely works because it is transfer 
appropriate to the demands of the “test.” (Transfer-inappropri-
ate difficulty is undesirable.) A very similar prescription is to 
take advantage of the testing effect (Roediger & Karpicke, 
2006); a series of tests promotes better performance on a final 
test, compared with a series of reexposures to the to-be-
remembered materials. Similarly, in clinical situations, thera-
pists sometimes try to simulate stressful distractions of real 
life so that clients can practice the prescribed coping under 
difficult conditions. Establishing variable conditions during 
practice is also a desirable difficulty, because variable condi-
tions promote good performance in new situations (see Bjork, 
1994; McDaniel & Callender, 2010). Anxious and depressed 
individuals are faced with a variety of ambiguous situations in 
real life. When one is not sure what conditions will hold dur-
ing real-life tests, the wise course is to vary conditions during 
training to optimize transfer (e.g., Mackintosh et al., 2006).
In summary, the main criteria regarding cognitive proce-
dures to be used in modifying cognitive biases are their com-
patibility with those occurring during the challenges that life 
presents and their tendency to promote changes in the long 
term. These are also the lessons learned from much older tradi-
tions of associative learning.
Associative learning
With roots in the infancy of experimental psychology, contem-
porary learning theory provides useful perspectives on the eti-
ology and maintenance of emotional disorders, anxiety 
disorders in particular (see Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). Fear-
related Pavlovian or operant contingencies are established 
through direct or vicarious conditioning and aided by human 
tendencies to be evolutionarily prepared for them. Any attempt 
to change emotional reactions therefore should be understand-
able in terms of basic principles of associative learning, such 
as extinction and counterconditioning. It is important to note 
that these methods of behavior change do not cause unlearning 
of the fear contingencies but instead establish new contingen-
cies that strongly rely on their context (Bouton, 2000). Lapse 
and relapse, in which the original contingencies dominate to 
guide behavior, tend to occur if features of the context revert 
to earlier conditions (the renewal effect) or if the original sig-
nificant outcomes occur noncontingently (reinstatement). 
Spontaneous recovery of the original response is also likely to 
occur when fear-evoking cues are presented following a period 
of time subsequent to extinction or counterconditioning trials 
(i.e., following time after therapy sessions have ended).
Do similar dangers of lapse and relapse of old habits 
characterize CBM procedures? In interpretation retraining, 
contingencies between ambiguous situations and their preex-
perimental resolutions are, in effect, counterconditioned. Con-
sider anxious participants, for whom the signal is an ambiguous 
situation harboring the possibility of threat; the original sig-
nificant outcome (the unconditioned stimulus) is the threaten-
ing resolution, and the new outcome is a benign resolution. 
Bouton (2000) actually described the signal in typical extinc-
tion or counterconditioning paradigms as having two possible 
meanings, one old and one new; the current meaning of the 
ambiguous signal is determined by the exteroceptive, intero-
ceptive, or temporal context. At first, when the context is 
changed in the animal laboratory (e.g., from one apparatus to 
the next), behavior generalizes (or in theoretical terms, the 
expectancy of the original outcome holds), much like when 
human participants begin a series of training trials and reveal 
their typical resolutions of ambiguity, trained by real life. Then 
counterconditioning trials ensue, and we can understand them 
from a Pavlovian perspective of an ambiguous (negative or 
positive) cue predicting the targeted positive resolution. (See 
Clerkin & Teachman, 2010, for a similar application of condi-
tioning principles to CBM.) Alternatively, from an operant 
perspective, an ambiguous cue can set the occasion for the 
reinforcement of target resolutions. Most forms of CBM 
include reinforcement of some kind, in that tasks are designed 
to reward the desired response (e.g., attending to a benign 
stimulus or meaning), either because doing so makes perfor-
mance easier and more fluent or because overt feedback is 
provided (e.g., a “correct” signal). As we also learn from 
research on desirable difficulties, variable conditions of 
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training promote transfer beyond the conditioning episodes, as 
do temporally spaced training sessions (Bjork, 1994; Bouton, 
2000).
If the results from animal conditioning experiments apply 
to CBM paradigms, however, signals presented in contexts 
that differ from the CBM context should lead to robust renewal 
of the initial response, and occasional experiences with nega-
tive events should reinstate it. In part, renewal, reinstatement, 
and spontaneous recovery might be responsible for occasional 
difficulties in finding evidence of far transfer after CBM. 
Researchers with interests in therapeutic applications have 
tried to overcome that difficulty in ways that are consistent 
with Bouton’s (2000) analysis. One method is to promote 
retrieval of the context for new learning—the training phase. 
Methods for reminding participants about training experiences 
as they encounter adverse events should enhance the chance of 
generalization or transfer, as should the use of ecologically rel-
evant episodes during training. In related investigations of 
exposure therapy with phobic participants, instructions to 
think back to the therapy session during behavioral testing 
were found to improve transfer to a new context (Mystkowski, 
Craske, Echiverri, & Labus, 2006). Reminders can also be 
offered by others; in one anecdote reported by Brosan, Hop-
pitt, Shelfer, Sillence, and Mackintosh (2011) after an anxious 
patient described his CBM session to his wife, she began say-
ing “beep” (the error signal) to him whenever she saw him 
begin worrying.
In short, the literatures concerning conditioning and mem-
ory principles converge in ways that are relevant to treatment 
with CBM. Applications of CBM should include methods for 
overcoming renewal, reinstatement, and spontaneous recovery 
of the preexperimental bias. For example, the foregoing dis-
cussion suggests that training should incorporate situational 
cues that typically provoke the deployment of negative biases 
in real life. Subsequent encounters with such real events 
should then provide automatic reminders of the newly acquired 
adaptive response. More generally, awareness of this analogy 
between CBM and conditioning paradigms reminds us about 
the values inherent in functional or behavioral approaches to 
understanding what we commonly consider to be mental phe-
nomena (see De Houwer, 2011).
Considerations of automaticity versus 
cognitive control
Although we have recommended the use of research on desir-
able difficulties as a model for how to achieve transfer in the 
modification of cognitive biases, we acknowledge that experi-
ments concerning desirable difficulties largely involve situa-
tions in which individuals explicitly attempt to remember, and 
CBM transfer tasks usually do not use explicit instructions to 
think back to training. Alternatively, the analogy to condition-
ing paradigms promotes the idea that change is achieved 
implicitly through the modification of cognitive habits, with-
out conscious reference to the training phase. In attempting to 
define CBM paradigms, for example, Koster et al. (2009, p. 3) 
suggested that “[c]ommonly, it has been the case that the tar-
geted bias represents a pattern of processing selectivity that 
appears to operate automatically, in the sense of proceeding 
swiftly without intention, and so is not readily amenable to 
volitional control.” However, just as memory tests are not 
“process pure” (Jacoby, 1991), training sessions likely operate 
in habitual ways to influence current attention and interpreta-
tion but also consciously come to mind in a recollective sense. 
In fact, participants sometimes report consciously thinking 
back to specific training scenarios as they perform real-life 
transfer tasks (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010). Similarly, training 
can be more effective following explicit instructions about the 
contingency between cues and targets (Krebs, Hirsch, & 
Mathews, 2010). On the other hand, postexperimental inter-
views usually fail to reveal awareness of the training manipu-
lation in the sense that participants later deny seeing any causal 
connection between the training procedure and their own later 
reactions in challenging situations (e.g., Amir, Beard, Taylor, 
et al., 2009; Hirsch et al., 2009). These reports of lack of 
awareness might be more convincing if we could rely on the 
accuracy of self-reports about recollection during transfer that 
are made subsequently, but self-reports about cognitive proce-
dures are usually not reliable. In short, an important direction 
for bias-modification research is the exploration of the extent 
to which training experiences establish new habits or provide 
the basis for controlled recollection, as well as the contexts 
under which automatic or controlled processes dominate in 
producing good transfer.
What do we know about the involvement of controlled pro-
cedures in training paradigms? First, practice in deliberately 
suppressing (i.e., controlling “against”) the retrieval of learned 
negative responses clearly impairs later deliberate recall, par-
ticularly when thought substitutes are used to help participants 
not think about the target words to be suppressed (Joormann et 
al., 2009). This is a finding that challenges popular assump-
tions about the inevitability of rebound following attempts at 
thought suppression. The success of suppression-induced for-
getting, replicated in many experiments using the think/no-
think paradigm (see Anderson & Huddleston, in press), likely 
results from the many trials of practicing suppression in 
response to specific cues, whereas other methods offer less 
well-controlled and repetitive means.
Deliberate recall has also been instructed during the trans-
fer phase of a more typical paradigm for interpretation training 
(Hertel et al., in press). Participants were instructed to com-
plete some transfer scenarios in the same way as they had 
completed contextually similar prior scenarios and to com-
plete others differently. For example, if a training scenario 
described being on a plane to Florida, the analogous transfer 
scenario might describe being on a plane to Spain. When 
instructed to respond as before, the correct response to the 
transfer scenario was to complete it in the same way (i.e., 
benign or negative) as the related original or in the converse 
manner if instructed to respond differently. Estimates of 
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controlled recollection were calculated as the difference 
between the proportion of correct completions under instruc-
tions to respond in the same way and the proportion of incor-
rect completions under instructions to respond differently (see 
Jacoby, 1991). The main finding was that benign training pro-
actively interfered with the controlled recollection of negative 
interpretations. This finding does not demonstrate training-
congruent facilitation of control, because it represents defi-
cient recollection of test scenarios previously resolved in a 
training-incongruent manner, not enhanced recollection for 
those resolved in the trained direction. The lack of facilitation 
might reflect what we learned from research on spontaneous 
transfer in problem solving—that problem-oriented training 
does not provide the best transfer to a memory-oriented test 
phase (Needham & Begg, 1991). The process-dissociation 
experiments (Hertel et al., in press) also failed to find evidence 
for effects of training on automatic components of transfer, but 
this outcome should be interpreted in light of the fact that 
CBM transfer tasks do not usually call attention to the connec-
tions between training and transfer, as is required by process-
dissociation procedures at test. Other methods of assessing 
automatic influences might tell a different story about auto-
matic components of transfer.
As yet there has been little neuroimaging research that 
could cast light on the contribution of cognitive control to bias 
modification. Evidence for greater activation of the lateral 
frontal cortex during test trials that required attention to be 
directed differently from that previously practiced was taken 
as evidence that such activation mediates training effects 
(Browning, Holmes, Murphy, Goodwin, & Harmer, 2010). 
Because the lateral frontal cortex is implicated in intentional 
control, this finding might argue against exclusively automatic 
effects. However, the effect was observed during violations of 
the trained rule during test trials (i.e., when target detection 
required attention to the alternate location to that induced dur-
ing training), so it may be that intentional control is imple-
mented only when participants have to voluntarily override 
the practiced responses. A prediction that remains to be tested 
is whether a similar pattern of activation during training that 
counteracts preexperimental bias would decrease toward the 
end of the training trials and thereby constitutes evidence for a 
newly trained habit.
In summary, despite the apparent importance of this issue, 
it is simply too soon to know to what extent and in what ways 
controlled and automatic processes are involved in CBM. Res-
olution will require care in specifying the sense in which pro-
cedures should be conceived as controlled or automatic (see 
Moors & De Houwer, 2006). Clearly, experimental control of 
practice is ultimately responsible for transfer effects in CBM, 
so the issues concern the degree to which and manner in which 
individuals’ use of self-initiated conflict resolution or deliber-
ate search processes (frontally mediated procedures) charac-
terizes, benefits, or impairs transfer and whether those effects 
are restricted to initial stages of bias modification. The extreme 
position that performance on near- or far-transfer tasks is 
intentionally made to be consistent with training is refuted by 
participants’ denial of connections between training and trans-
fer tasks. Moreover, awareness of connections to the past can 
be epiphenomenal to essentially automatic responding. As in 
learning a new motor skill like riding a bicycle or hitting a ten-
nis ball, performance can come under the control of practice 
without any awareness of the underlying automatic compo-
nents that must be recruited or inhibited. If CBM is similar to 
motor learning in this respect, then fundamental processes 
influencing ease of access to emotional meanings may be 
modified during practice, yet produce changes that are typi-
cally attributed to controlled operations such as the intent to 
reinterpret. In short, people do not always judge the cause of 
their actions accurately, even while experiencing intent.
Relation to Other Research on Cognition–
Emotion Interactions
In this section, we compare the procedures and outcomes of 
CBM experiments to those found in other research traditions 
concerned with cognition and emotion interactions. In some 
cases, the understanding of CBM findings can be informed by 
reference to more established research domains, but in other 
cases we argue that CBM methods offer more nuanced tools 
that can be used to research questions relevant to these other 
areas.
Mood and cognition
CBM experiments are not the first experiments on affect and 
cognition to examine the direction of cause. Various methods 
associated with other research traditions have sought to estab-
lish emotion as both the cause and effect of thoughts and mem-
ories (see Parrott & Hertel, 1999). Like CBM research, some 
of this research has focused on emotional states that result 
from particular styles of thinking. For example, the manipula-
tion of ruminative versus distracting thoughts has produced 
changes in depressed mood (e.g., Fennell & Teasdale, 1984; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). Manipulations of rumi-
nation, although not devised for the purpose of establishing or 
eliminating specific cognitive biases, are quite similar to CBM 
manipulations in that they also have been shown to produce 
changes in performance on subsequent cognitive tasks, some 
of which are good examples of far transfer (e.g., Hertel & El-
Messidi, 2006; Joormann & Siemer, 2004; Lyubomirsky, 
Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998).
The opposite direction of causality in cognition–emotion 
interactions has served as the focus of a much larger literature 
on the effects of mood manipulations. Among other ways, 
mood ostensibly has been manipulated through hypnosis, self 
statements, success or failure, films, pictures, and music (see 
Parrott & Hertel, 1999), and consequences for performance on 
tests of attention, judgment, and memory have been examined. 
In our view, many of these experiments are also similar to 
CBM experiments, because the manipulations are essentially 
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cognitive. They are viewed as mood manipulations primarily 
because researchers perform manipulation checks to deter-
mine if mood has been changed in the expected directions, but 
the causal status of mood is typically not established. The clas-
sic example is the ubiquitous Velten mood-induction proce-
dure (Velten, 1968), in which participants read and think about 
a series of statements about oneself or the world that are emo-
tionally positive, neutral, or negative. This manipulation 
overtly changes the nature of thoughts in ways that have sub-
sequent cognitive and self-reported emotional consequences, 
much as bias training transfers to other cognitive tasks and 
affects subsequent emotional reactions.
In all traditions (CBM and earlier cognition–emotion 
experiments), we cannot always be certain that the direction of 
cause conforms in simple ways to the focus of our manipula-
tion. Manipulations of cognitive procedures might masquer-
ade as mood manipulations or vice versa. Thoughts can have 
immediate emotional consequences that in turn direct the 
focus of other thoughts. Our inferences about cause are only as 
tight as the experimental design permits. In that regard, how-
ever, it is important to note that several CBM experiments 
have not produced changes in mood states immediately fol-
lowing training. In fact, although the scenario-based method 
of interpretation training (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000) can 
lead to immediate mood changes, most other methods (involv-
ing interpretation or attention to single words) do not, as 
assessed by self-rating or questionnaire measures (e.g., Hop-
pitt et al., 2010a, 2010b; MacLeod et al., 2002; Wilson et al., 
2006). Despite this lack of mood induction by training, differ-
ences in emotional vulnerability can still be revealed later, in 
response to a potentially threatening or distressing event. Fur-
thermore, a direct comparison between a traditional (musical) 
mood induction and interpretation training showed that the 
latter resulted in congruent changes on the scrambled sentence 
test (Rude, Valdez, Odom, & Ebrahimi, 2003), but there were 
no such changes on the same test following mood manipula-
tion (Standage, Ashwin, & Fox, 2010). Another experiment in 
which direction of training and mood induction were indepen-
dently manipulated showed that posttraining mood did not 
modify responses to a subsequent transfer test to assess inter-
pretation bias (Salemink & van den Hout, 2010). In short, 
CBM cannot simply be seen as a variant on mood manipula-
tions. Typically, mood manipulations do not systematically 
guide attention or the interpretation of ambiguity, and they are 
not designed to promote transfer to similar situations.
In a more general sense, cognitive bias manipulations differ 
from previous manipulations in the specificity of their methods 
and goals. The previous methods were designed to induce gen-
eral cognitive or affective states (such as rumination or sadness) 
believed to have general consequences (negative feelings or 
memories) by virtue of some theoretical mechanism such as 
activation in a semantic network (e.g., Bower, 1981). CBM 
methods target specific cognitive procedures with the potential 
to emerge in a variety of circumstances (such as attending to 
a threatening thought or event or interpreting ambiguity in a 
negative light) and that are practiced in ways that should trans-
fer to similar new situations. In our view, the compatibility of 
CBM with functional analyses derived from associative learn-
ing and transfer-appropriate-processing frameworks sidesteps 
the global assumptions that characterized early research on cog-
nition and emotion (also see MacLeod, Koster, & Fox, 2009).
Appraisal theory
Appraisal theorists have long proposed that emotions arise from 
a cognitive process in which individuals evaluate the personal 
implications of an event, including their ability to control or 
cope with it, and that variations in emotion depend primarily on 
the outcome of this process (e.g., Roseman, 1991; Smith & 
Lazarus, 1993). The CBM approach clearly shares the common 
goal of investigating the assumed role played by cognitive pro-
cesses in emotion, yet the methods of investigation differ. 
Appraisal theories have generally been tested by showing that 
the self-reported relevance of an event is a good predictor of 
emotional response and not by modifying processes assumed to 
contribute to appraisal but likely inaccessible to conscious 
report, as in CBM experiments. Application of modification 
methods might thus prove useful in testing tenets of appraisal 
theory. Conversely, the extensive evidence of individual differ-
ences found in appraisal research should usefully inform future 
CBM experiments.
An example of the first direction of possible cross-applica-
tion is provided by Schartau, Dalgleish, and Dunn (2009), who 
showed that practice in adopting a benign appraisal style dur-
ing exposure to aversive pictures resulted in a later reduction 
of negative emotion during the viewing of a video depicting 
serious accidents. Further experiments would be required to 
provide more precise information on the specific processes 
underlying such instructed appraisal. Concerning the reverse 
direction of application, it might be possible to understand 
some failures to find far-transfer effects in CBM experiments 
by considering individual differences in appraisals. For exam-
ple, the absence of any benefit from training positive social 
interpretations on later reactions to failing a cognitive test 
(Salemink et al., 2007) might in retrospect be understood in 
terms of the different appraisals associated with affiliative and 
achievement concerns (Smith & Pope, 1992). Design of future 
far-transfer experiments might thus profit from knowing about 
the emotional consequences of variations in appraisal style 
across individuals and events. Conversely, CBM methods 
should provide a useful tool to test specific causal assumptions 
of appraisal theory in a more analytic way.
Relation to Cognitive Behavior Therapy
CBM applications to clinical disorders overlap to some extent 
with cognitive behavior therapy (CBT). Both involve direct 
attempts to modify cognitive processes believed to underlie 
emotional distress, and both employ systematic exposure to the 
events that trigger distress. In CBT, exposure to evocative 
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events is designed to reduce emotional reactions via extinction 
(sometimes referred to as habituation) or to collect evidence 
against false beliefs by showing that anticipated catastrophic 
consequences do not occur. Indeed, it is often thought that 
attempts to avoid accessing fear-evoking representations serve 
to maintain anxiety, because stored emotional memories must 
be fully activated before they can be changed (Foa & Kozak, 
1986). This hypothesis sometimes leads clinicians to predict 
that avoidance of attention to threats can worsen emotional 
symptoms. In CBM, by contrast, extinction due to exposure is 
not thought to be the agent of change; in fact, training and con-
trol conditions sometimes involve a similar extent of exposure 
to potential threat cues. Instead, the critical difference between 
training and control conditions is how such evocative events are 
processed (i.e., whether potential threat cues are to be attended 
or not, or how they are interpreted or recalled). The effective-
ness of CBM thus suggests that fear-evoking events do not need 
to be fully realized for change to occur, as some clinical 
researchers have assumed, because training to avoid threats—in 
favor of alternative meanings or events—can be beneficial. This 
conclusion suggests possible alternative explanations for the 
effectiveness of CBT, such as alterations in the relative ease of 
retrieving positive versus negative emotional memories (see 
Brewin, 2006). Direct empirical comparisons between CBT and 
CBM perspectives on fear, investigating the extent to which 
they have overlapping or differential effects, would thus consti-
tute a worthwhile direction for future research.
To be sure, CBT also targets inappropriate cognitive con-
tent, but here the usual means of change is to directly chal-
lenge the reportable thoughts believed to maintain distress. In 
contrast, CBM involves repeated trials that target processes 
typically not available to conscious report, and as we have 
argued earlier, participants are not necessarily aware of the 
resultant changes. Nonetheless, as CBM moves into therapy 
settings, this last distinction might become less pronounced, 
with therapists giving their clients more explicit guidance 
about what is required (Krebs et al., 2010). (In this regard, we 
should consider the possibility that explicit instructions for 
change might sidestep processes that promote longer lasting 
effects.) Similarly, as CBT embraces the use of computer-con-
trolled methods (Andrews, Cuijpers, Craske, McEvoy, & 
Titov, 2010), possibilities for integration are likely to increase.
Conclusion
From the outset, CBM research has been motivated and guided 
by hypotheses emerging from clinical research and practice, 
such as hypotheses concerning the causal role for cognitive 
processes in emotional disorders postulated by pioneers such 
as Beck (1976). As in other experimental approaches, hypoth-
esis testing has forced CBM researchers to be more precise 
about putative causes when designing modification methods. 
Causal hypotheses are then tested in what has become known 
as experimental-psychopathology research, in which symp-
toms of disorders may be produced or reversed. One example 
is provided by the work cited earlier showing that changing 
the style of thinking associated with rumination reduces 
depressed mood (Watkins et al., 2009). In another example, 
the hypothesis that depression is maintained by the tendency 
to attribute negative outcomes to the self and positive out-
comes elsewhere was confirmed by experimentally inducing 
this attributional style in one group and the opposite style in 
another (Peters, Constans, & Mathews, in press). CBM 
research also allows the investigation of competing hypothe-
ses, such as whether pathological worry is exacerbated by a 
failure to disengage attention or by enhanced engagement with 
threatening content (Hirsch et al., 2011). Thus, starting from 
the general idea that the biases characteristic of emotional dis-
orders may contribute to maintaining them, CBM researchers 
develop methods for testing specific hypotheses about the 
conditions under which cognitive processes exacerbate or 
reduce emotional symptoms, and then the results of those tests 
can be used to guide the development of new treatments.
Beyond strictly clinical concerns, research paradigms gath-
ered together under the rubric of cognitive bias modification 
are nothing more and nothing less than tools to test assump-
tions, often initially unspecified, about interactions between 
cognitive and emotional processes. If we think we understand 
a phenomenon, we design a procedure to simulate it with naive 
individuals by bringing the putative processes under experi-
mental control. Transfer-appropriate and contextually sensi-
tive operations constitute basic rules of engagement. If we 
understand it well enough, the phenomenon in question can be 
not only simulated but also manipulated to produce changes in 
mental and emotional well-being.
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